


# Countermeasures: Proactive Self-Defense Against Ubiquitous Surveillance

**Lisa Shay and Greg Conti**

West Point

[lisa.shay@usma.edu](mailto:lisa.shay@usma.edu)

[gregory.conti@usma.edu](mailto:gregory.conti@usma.edu)



# Disclaimers



The views in this talk are the authors' and don't reflect the official policy or position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

Context matters. Some of these countermeasures are likely illegal in certain (or all) circumstances. If you have questions in this regard, consult a lawyer. We are not lawyers.

All characters and events in this show – even those based on real people – are entirely fictional. All celebrity voices are impersonated... poorly. The following program contains coarse language and due to its content it should not be viewed by anyone.

# Takeaways

- Networked surveillance systems threaten our privacy and our free way of life
- Individuals can and should protect themselves
- This community has the knowledge and status to deflect the trajectory of our surveilled future



If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

- Sun Tzu

# Current Trends

# Instrumented People



“Government of India Plans to Track Mobile Phone Users”

“World's Biggest Biometric ID Scheme Forges Ahead”  
(1.2B People)

# Instrumented Homes



TV's that watch you.

# Instrumented Communities



**\$1 Billion Scientific “Ghost Town”**

# New Applications



Emperor Penguins Counted from Space

# New Applications



## Police Use of Surveillance Drones

# New Power Sources



Robojelly – Powered  
by Hydrogen and  
Oxygen in Water



Nuclear Powered  
Drone Research -  
Flight time from  
“days to months”

# Lots of Investment



Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport launches \$20M HD Surveillance Camera Project

# Lots of Investment




## Lower Manhattan Security Initiative

# Increased Capabilities



## SoundHound

# Increased Capabilities



Facial Recognition

# Increased Capabilities



## Man-Machine Hybrid Analysis


Google Using ReCAPTCHA to Decode Street View Addresses

[http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/The\\_wilson\\_front\\_door.JPG](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/The_wilson_front_door.JPG)

<http://techcrunch.com/2012/03/29/google-now-using-recaptcha-to-decode-street-view-addresses/>

<http://tech.slashdot.org/story/12/03/29/2055228/google-using-recaptcha-to-decode-street-addresses>

# Increased Capabilities



MIT Lincoln Lab Technology Provides Real-Time Video Through Solid Walls

# New Incentives



GPS used for Driving Insurance “Discounts”


# Old Reasons

“We are conducting an anonymous mobile phone survey to help us enhance your shopping experience.”



Malls Track Shoppers' Cell Phones

# Coercive Disclosure of Identity

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M. Gandhi". The signature is written in a cursive, fluid style with a prominent loop at the end of the "i".

Google+ Real-Name Policy

# Same System Vulnerabilities



See...

Tom Cross, "Exploiting Lawful Intercept to Wiretap the Internet" Black Hat DC 2010

Zeljka Zorz, "Most CCTV Systems are Easily Accessible to Attackers" Help Net Security

# Lots of “Blue-Sky Ideas”



## US Postal Trucks as Fleet of Sensor Platforms

# The Potential for Misuse is High...




# We'll Leave Online Surveillance for Another Talk...




# Deconstructing a Surveillance System


# Surveillance System Model




# Surveillance System Model




# Surveillance System Model




# Surveillance System Model



# Surveillance System Model



# Surveillance System Model



# Countermeasures

# Understand the Sensor/System



- Acquire
- Understand
- Take it apart
- Spec sheets
- Range
- Power consumption
- Processing ability
- Sampling rate
- Response time
- Sensitivity
- Age
- Maintenance
- Environment
- Limitations
- Vulnerabilities

See Joe Grand, Jacob Appelbaum, and Chris Tarnovsky's Defcon 17 "Smart Parking Meter" Talk

**Deny, Degrade, Defeat Sensors**

# Detect



Car Radar Detector (Japan)

# Detect

Main Exploits Research Videos Anniversary Promotion Register | Login

SHODAN

**EXPOSE ONLINE DEVICES.**


WEBCAMS. ROUTERS.  
POWER PLANTS. IPHONES. WIND TURBINES.  
REFRIGERATORS. VOIP PHONES.

TAKE A TOUR FREE SIGN UP

Popular Search Queries: **default password** - Finds results with "default password" in the banner; the named defaults might work!

Networked Sensors may be visible online

# Monitor Location and Time of Use



Washington DC Area  
DDOT Traffic Camera  
Locations  
(Government Data)

## NYC Surveillance Camera Project

Breakout lists by community board

- [Community Board 1](#)
- [Community Board 2](#)
- [Community Board 3](#)
- [Community Board 4](#)
- [Community Board 5](#)
- [Community Board 6](#)
- [Community Board 7](#)
- [Community Board 8](#)
- [Community Board 9](#)
- [Community Board 10](#)
- [Community Board 11](#)

### Community Board 12

- 111 Total cameras

155th Street and Broadway:  
1 stationary camera

155th Street between Broadway and Riverside Drive:  
2 stationary cameras

Audobon Terrace between 155th and 156th Streets:  
1 stationary camera

156th Street and Broadway:  
2 stationary cameras

157th Street and Broadway:  
1 stationary camera

158th Street between Broadway and Henry Hudson Parkway:  
3 stationary cameras, 2 north side , 1 south side--under the Riverside Dr overpass

NYC Surveillance  
Camera Project  
(Community Driven)

# Understand Range and Coverage

**STANDARD RANGE CARD**  
For use of this form see F-7.7J The proponent agency is TRADOC

SQD 1  
PLT 2  
CO \_\_\_\_\_

May be used for all types of direct fire weapons.

MAGNETIC NORTH

DATA SECTION

POSITION IDENTIFICATION PRIMARY DATE 3 MAR 90 / 1140 HRS

WEAPON 1TV E-21 EACH CIRCLE EQUALS 400  
METERS

NO.	DIRECTION/ DEFLECTION	ELEVATION	RANGE	AMMO	DESCRIPTION
L	350°		2000M	TOW2	FARM HOUSE
R	105°		2600M	TOW2	R/SIDE WOODLINE
1	360°		3200M	TOW2	RP- HILLTOP
2	351°		2700M	TOW2	TRP- A8002 RJ
3	04°		1800M	TOW2	TRP- A8003 RJ

REMARKS:  
4 WRP- RJ AT LN 13629411, 100° AT 320M

DA FORM 5517-R, FEB 86

## Improved TOW Vehicle Range Card

# Bypass



# Bypass

**FAIL**



# Bypass



# Sampling Rate, Sensitivity

**BUSTED** - A heat detector can be fooled by heating the room to body temperature.

**CONFIRMED** - A heat detector can be fooled by wearing a highly insulated fire proximity suit.

**CONFIRMED** - A heat detector can be fooled by placing glass between the intruder and the sensor.


**BUSTED** - An ultrasonic motion detector can be fooled by wearing thick-padded clothing.

**CONFIRMED** - An ultrasonic motion detector can be fooled by holding a bedsheet in front of you.

**CONFIRMED** - An ultrasonic motion detector can be fooled by moving extremely slowly.

See <http://mythbustersresults.com/episode59>


# Glass Blocks IR




# As Does Acrylic



# But Be Careful How You Hold It



# Shielding




Wi-Fi Shielding Wallpaper



RFID Blocking Wallet



Laptop Compubody Sock




Stand-off Distance / Air Gap

# Shielding



Santa's Helpers Disable Naughty Cameras in Tempe

# Cloaking



## Graphene-based Invisibility Cloak

# Chaffing



Navy Wants Ultraviolet Cloaking Device for Jet Fighters

# Absorption



## Radar Absorbing Materials

# Jam



Green Laser Pointer in Webcam

# Destroy



Microwave Oven HERF Gun

# Disable



Black Tape



Microphone Plugs



# Deny, Degrade, Defeat Processing

# Spoofting




WWII Operation  
Bodyguard



~2010 Russian Inflatable  
Weapons

# Camouflage



HMS Argus (1917)



CV Dazzle (2012)

Camouflage for Computer Vision

See Joshua Marpet's "Facial Recognition: Facts, Fiction, and Fscck-ups" from Defcon 18 and <http://cvdazzle.com/>

# Degrade Information Quality



The Prisoner - "It's Your Funeral"

# Overcome Processing



**Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System**  
(See NY Times 10 March 2012 story by Michelle Alexander)

# Data Collection, Retention, Storage and Lifespan

# Secure Data In Transit / At Rest



Privacy Glasses

89 24 59 c8 cf fd 88 d1 53 b9 38 82 b3 6d 58 9a  
14 00 67 68 ec 92 5a 6d 44 92 75 db 2a b3 36 2b  
37 1a 44 21 96 d9 12 b6 71 b4 cf f6 45 9a a5 68  
19 6c 95 f2 ae 65 61 91 3a 1b da 1d 6f 22 eb be  
c3 20 cc 62 24 54 e5 53 b9 04 82 2b eb a7 d8 67  
75 9b 12 b5 1f c8 b9 c2 aa 8b 79 cd 09 b2 7d a2  
92 82 b3 4c c1 1f 2c 4c 9a bc 3b f2 75 e8 07 47  
7e 1a fa 41 cc 41 b9 c4 e6 12 1c ce 31 67 15 cf

Encryption

# Destroy Data




Shredder (SSI)



Degausser (Japanese Platform)

See also overflow or corrupt storage and resource consumption in general...

# Avoid Generating Data



Become a Neo-Luddite




Live in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century



Live in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century

# Communications and Command and Control

# Take Control



Apple's "Systems and Methods for Receiving Infrared Data with a Camera Design to Detect Images Based on Visible Light"

# Take Control

The screenshot shows the Washington Post Social Reader app interface. At the top, there is a logo and the text "Log into Washington Post Social Reader" and "A New Way to Spread the News". Below this, there is a section titled "See the news your friends are reading and share each article you read with your friends. Click Add to Timeline to start." followed by "Add Washington Post Social Reader to your Timeline" and "Includes articles you read and more.".

The "This activity is visible to:" dropdown menu is open, showing the following options:

- Public
- Friends
- Custom
- Close Friends
- Tech Friends
- Limited Profile
- See all lists...

Below the menu, there is a section titled "Washington Post Social needs:" with a list of items: "Your description", "Your likes", "Friends' interests", and "Friends' likes". At the bottom, there is a button "Log In and Add to Timeline" and a "Cancel" button. A notification at the bottom left says "28 friends use this app." with small profile pictures.

But beware the illusion of control

# DOS

(The Human and the Communication Channel)



The screenshot shows the top navigation bar of the Ars Technica website. It includes the 'ars technica' logo, an Intel Xeon advertisement, and an IBM BladeCenter advertisement. Below the navigation bar is a main menu with links for 'MAIN MENU', 'MY STORIES: 0', 'FORUMS', and 'SUBSCRIBE NOW'. The article title is 'LAW & DISORDER / CIVILIZATION & DISCONTENTS' followed by the main headline: '"Reverse robocall" campaign lets citizens phone-blast SOPA supporters'. The sub-headline reads: 'A website run by two privacy advocates is giving people a chance to deliver ...'. The author is 'by Sean Gallagher - Dec 27 2011, 10:35am EST'. The article text begins with: 'A Web-based civic action site is providing a way for people irate about the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) to voice their opinions in a very literal way. Reverse Robocall, a site set up by Shaun Dakin and Aaron Titus, allows users to record a message through the site and perform their own robocalls to politicians and lobbyists. For a fee of \$10, Reverse Robocall will let you record a message that will be delivered as a phone call to the offices of the co-sponsors of SOPA and each of the associations and lobbying groups that have backed the bill in Congress—88 in all. You can even customize the phone number that will appear in caller ID for the call in order to avoid being blocked by systems that reject calls without them. And, if you choose, you can let others listen into your message on the site and rate your effort.'


## Reverse Robocall

# Understand the Actors




- Owners
- Enablers / Purveyors
- Information Consumers
- Regulators
- Targets (the Surveilled)


# Model in Context




# Model in Context




# Model in Context




# Model in Context




# Model in Context



# Model in Context



# Model in Context




# Influence Policy and Policy Makers

# Vote







# Look to History and Surveillance Cultures



East Germany



Prison





McCarthy-era

# Culture Jamming




Graffiti on Billboard in Cambridge, UK

# Rally Support



Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) Blackout Day – 18 January 2012

# Cry Foul...




"Listen, Tom, we can make this easy," the voice says as a satellite image zooms in from space onto Tom's house.

"Tom, we do know who you are," the narrator continues before a caption appears on the screen, "Find us before we find you."

PA Tax Amnesty TV ad "We Know Who You Are"

# And Sometimes it Will Have the Desired Effect...



# And Sometimes it Will Have the Desired Effect...

Antibiotic overnight - Mozilla Firefox

File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help

Antibiotic overnight

www.pataxpayup.com

24/7 Support  
Toll Free 1-800-985-1351  
Live support Online

Shopping cart

Bestsellers FAQ Shipping policy Contact us About us Track Order

Fastest delivery, up to 2 days!

Increasing discount on reorders

ED T only

To proceed please enable Cookies in your browser.

Accutane	\$1.67	Order
Amoxil	\$1.33	Order
Cialis	\$1.67	Order
Cialis Soft	\$2.00	Order
Cipro	\$0.92	Order
Clomid	\$0.83	Order
Diflucan	\$1.50	Order
Flagyl	\$0.50	Order
Kamagra®	\$1.96	Order
Kamagra® Oral Jelly	\$2.50	Order
Kamagra® Soft	\$2.42	Order

 <b>Cialis</b> Tadalafil 10/20mg <b>\$1.67</b> Buy now!	 <b>Cialis Soft</b> Tadalafil 20mg <b>\$2.00</b> Buy now!	 <b>Kamagra®</b> Sildenafil Citrate 100mg <b>\$1.96</b> Buy now!
 <b>Levitra</b> Vardenafil 20mg <b>\$2.42</b> Buy now!	 <b>Viagra</b> Sildenafil Citrate 50/100mg <b>\$1.12</b> Buy now!	 <b>Viagra Soft</b> Sildenafil Citrate 100mg <b>\$1.42</b> Buy now!

How this site changed my life

Find:  Previous Next Highlight all Match case

# But Communicate Issues Effectively




See "'I've Got Nothing to Hide' and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy"  
by Daniel Solove for one powerful example.

# Art is Powerful

## CONGRESS, CAN YOU HEAR US?

Two bills before Congress, known as the Protect IP Act (PIPA) in the Senate and the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in the House, are meant to stop online piracy but would censor the Web and impose harmful regulations on American businesses. Experts agree that there are better ways to shut down pirate websites than asking US companies to censor the Web. Join the groundswell of experts, organizations and people from all parts of America united in their opposition to SOPA and PIPA. **Tell Congress not to censor the Web and not to cripple our innovation economy.**



ADD YOUR VOICE HERE




JOIN THE GROUNDSWELL  
[GOOGLE.COM/TAKEACTION](http://GOOGLE.COM/TAKEACTION)

Sources: Infojustice.org, Protect Innovation, Engine Advocacy, Center for Democracy and Technology, WhichHosedWebtoPeople, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren, Wikipedia, Stop American Censorship, Awaz

# Sometimes it Works

## Thank you Congress


A groundswell of opposition against PIPA and SOPA.  
**Thank you – and the more than 7 million other Americans – who stood up for the Web.**



# As is Science Fiction

BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU.  
WHO'S WATCHING BACK?


## LITTLE BROTHER




**CORY DOCTOROW**

"A rousing tale of techno-geek rebellion."

**SCOTT WESTERFELD,**  
author of **UGLIES**, **PRETTIES**, and **SPECIALS**



# Highlight Costs, Effectiveness, Security and Health Risks



“100 Naked Citizens: 100 Leaked Body Scans”

“A Colorado teen is upset with screeners at Salt Lake City International Airport. The type one diabetic says TSA agents were abrupt, rude and were responsible for breaking her \$10,000 insulin pump. A pump she has to have to survive.”

“... has spent nearly \$90 million replacing traditional magnetometers with controversial X-ray body scanning machines...”

“FDA Leans on Device Makers To Cut X-Ray Doses For Kids”

“\$1B of TSA Nude Body Scanners Made Worthless By Blog — How Anyone Can Get Anything Past The Scanners”

<http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/11/giz-scans/>


<http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/05/body-scanner-vulnerabilities>

<http://www.abc4.com/content/news/state/story/TSA-diabetes-salt-lake-insulin-savannah/Az-QjubuEUeXMX7LAbC1Xw.csp>

<http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/05/09/152337190/fda-leans-on-device-makers-to-cut-x-ray-doses-for-kids?ft=1&f=152337190>

<http://tsaoutofourpants.wordpress.com/2012/03/06/1b-of-nude-body-scanners-made-worthless-by-blog-how-anyone-can-get-anything-past-the-tsas-nude-body-scanners/>

# Transparency and Disclosure



# Sometimes Transparency Can be Painful...

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TECHNOLOGY | October 29, 2011

## U.S. Firm Acknowledges Syria Uses Its Gear to Block Web

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By JENNIFER VALENTINO-DEVRIES, PAUL SONNE and NOUR MALAS

A U.S. company that makes Internet-blocking gear acknowledges that Syria has been using at least 13 of its devices to censor Web activity there—an admission that comes as the Syrian government cracks down on its citizens and silences their online activities.

[Blue Coat Systems](#) Inc. of Sunnyvale, Calif., says it shipped the Internet "filtering" devices to Dubai late last year, believing they were destined for a department of the Iraqi government. However, the devices—which can block websites or record when people visit them—made their way to Syria, a country subject to strict U.S. trade

# Conduct and Share (Admissible) Research

## Privacy leakage vs. Protection measures: the growing disconnect

Balachander Krishnamurthy  
AT&T Labs—Research  
bala@research.att.com

Konstantin Naryshkin  
Worcester Polytechnic Institute  
konary@wpi.edu

Craig E. Wills  
Worcester Polytechnic Institute  
cew@cs.wpi.edu

### ABSTRACT

Numerous research papers have listed different vectors of personally identifiable information leaking via traditional and mobile Online Social Networks (OSNs) and highlighted the ongoing aggregation of data about users visiting popular Web sites. We argue that the landscape is worsening and existing proposals (including the recent U.S. Federal Trade Commission's report) do not address several key issues. We examined over 100 popular *non-OSN* Web sites across a number of categories where tens of millions of users representing diverse demographics have accounts, to see if these sites leak private information to prominent aggregators. Our results raise considerable concerns: we see leakage in sites for every category we examined; fully 56% of the sites directly leak pieces of private information with this result growing to 75% if we also include leakage of a site userid. Sensitive search strings sent to healthcare Web sites and travel itineraries on flight reservation sites are leaked in 9 of the top 10 sites studied for each category. The community needs a clear understanding of the shortcomings of existing privacy protection measures and the new proposals. The growing disconnect between the protection measures and increasing leakage and linkage suggests that we need to move beyond the losing battle with aggregators and examine what roles first-party sites can play in protecting privacy of their users.

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Recently, multiple vectors of private information leakage via Online Social Networks (OSN) and the two-decade long aggregation of data about users visiting popular Web sites have been reported. The problem of privacy has worsened significantly in spite of the various proposals and reports by researchers, government agencies, and privacy advocates. The ability of advertisers and third-party aggregators to collect a vast amount of increasingly personal information about users who visit various Web sites has been steadily growing. Numerous stories have expressed alarm about the situation with legislatures and privacy commissioners in different countries paying closer attention to the problem [1]. The awareness about the steady erosion of privacy on the part of users is growing slowly. The potential economic impact as a result of loss of brand value has forced some companies to start paying closer attention to complaints from users and privacy advocates.

In this paper we argue that the privacy landscape is worsening as there is a *growing* disconnect between steadily increasing leakage to and linkage by aggregators with existing and proposed protection measures. We show that beyond the egregious leakage of private information via OSNs and their more recent mobile counterparts, a key part of the Internet with tens of millions of users representing diverse demographics with accounts on popular *non-OSN* Web sites also suffer from private information leakage to prominent aggregators. Additionally, less well-understood notions of *linkage* are typically not addressed by most of the proposed privacy solutions. One such privacy issue arises from the existence of globally unique ids such as an OSN id or reused email addresses that could be used to link together pieces of seemingly distinct information. Beyond the intrinsic identifying nature of these ids, they aid in linking together other information, such as cookies from a home and work computer. New proposals, such as the recent United States Federal Trade Commission's December 2010 report [10], fail to address several key issues.

Our earlier work focused on longitudinal data gathering by aggregators on the Web [13], leakage of personal information via popular OSNs [13] and the more recently mobile OSNs [16]. However, there has been no attention paid thus far to another segment of the Internet where sites encourage and allow users to create accounts so that they could have a richer interaction experience. Many popular Web sites allowed users to establish profiles long even before the advent of OSNs. There are significant demographics that are present in non-OSN Web sites that may not be on OSN sites and their private information is also of interest to aggregators. On many of these sites, users create profiles with varying amounts of personal information, but typically less than what they supply on OSN sites. Unlike OSNs, these Web sites already have content and do not depend on users to create content; users could however add comments or tags. Surprisingly, there is considerable overlap in the nature of personal information that users provide across these sites. We should also note that the degree of sensitivity to different aspects of their personal information varies across users as is the potential for identifiability (ability to link a unit of personal information with a specific user).

We look at a broad array of sites in various categories

ACM Computers  
Freedom and Privacy

Workshop on  
Privacy in the  
Electronic Society  
(WPES)

Privacy Enhancing  
Technologies  
Symposium (PETS)

... and don't forget  
Legal, Government,  
Military, and Industry  
events

Don't Forget Executive Summary Versions too...

# Take it to Congress



TSA Oversight: Effective Security or Security Theater  
House Oversight Committee  
(26 March 2012)

The work of our two Committees has documented a recurring pattern of mismanagement and waste at the Transportation Security Administration.

Add to this an unending string of video clips, photographs and news reports about inappropriate, clumsy and even illogical searches and screenings by TSA agents...

# Take it to Court



FBI Turns Off Thousands of GPS Devices After Supreme Court Ruling

# Take it to the White House



White House “Privacy Bill of Rights”

# Some Have Chosen More Extreme Measures



Non-Violent Civil  
Disobedience



Principality of Sealand



Hactivism




Formation of the Pirate  
Party



Tahrir Square, Egypt  
8 February 2011

# Support Your Privacy Champions of Choice



# Join a Professional Society

## feature

*Connecting with Your Capitol:*

## How IEEE Members Can Influence Their State Governments



©iStockphoto.com/weetym



By Russell T. Harrison

IEEE-USA has a full-time staff of government affairs experts in Washington, D.C., to help represent IEEE members before Congress and the national media. But the federal government in Washington isn't the only government that can influence your profession.


In a federal system of government, like ours, the different levels of government have different responsibilities. So, for example, if you are concerned about contract law, licensure issues, or employment law, you probably want to talk to your state government officials—not your members of Congress in Washington.

While IEEE-USA staff can help with these efforts, much of the work will have to be done by local IEEE members themselves. And a local IEEE section or group of IEEE members have the ability to—and can—successfully influence their state legislatures.

State governments are, in general, easier to work with than the federal government. Each elected official represents fewer people than members of Congress.

continued on next page →

# Common Sense



Parting Thoughts...

# Lumbering Bureaucracy



# Beware Counter-Counter Measures



Miami Beach Police Ordered Videographer at  
Gunpoint to Hand Over Phone

# Don't be put off by Naysayers...

The introduction sounds more like a political manifesto than a piece of security research.

It is filled with inappropriate and sensational speculation (e.g., "Today's 'free' societies may slide toward a police state through Pearl Harbor-like events and totalitarian governments may rise to power. Consider [DARPA's] Total Information Awareness program...").

Before making such baseless assessments and implications, consider that people who work for DARPA and the U.S. government do participate in program committees.

# Well Intentioned, but...



## Communities Against Terrorism Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activities Related to Internet Café

## Suspicious Activities

“Overly concerned about privacy”

“Always pays cash”

“Use of anonymizers...

to shield IP address”

“Uses encryption”

“Downloads information

about electronics”

### What Should I Consider Suspicious?

#### People Who:

- Are overly concerned about privacy, attempts to shield the screen from view of others
- Always pay cash or use credit card(s) in different name(s)
- Apparently use tradecraft: lookout, blocker or someone to distract employees
- Act nervous or suspicious behavior inconsistent with activities
- Are observed switching SIM cards in cell phone or use of multiple cell phones
- Travel illogical distance to use Internet Café

#### Activities on Computer indicate:

- Evidence of a residential based internet provider (signs on to Comcast, AOL, etc.)
- Use of anonymizers, portals, or other means to shield IP address
- Suspicious or coded writings, use of code word sheets, cryptic ledgers, etc.
- Encryption or use of software to hide encrypted data in digital photos, etc.
- Suspicious communications using VOIP or communicating through a PC game

#### Use Computers to:

- Download content of extreme/radical nature with violent themes
- Gather information about vulnerable infrastructure or obtain photos, maps or diagrams of transportation, sporting venues, or populated locations
- Purchase chemicals, acids, hydrogen peroxide, acetone, fertilizer, etc.
- Download or transfer files with “how-to” content such as:
  - Content of extreme/radical nature with violent themes
  - Anarchist Cookbook, explosives or weapons information
  - Military tactics, equipment manuals, chemical or biological information
  - Terrorist/revolutionary literature
  - Preoccupation with press coverage of terrorist attacks
  - Defensive tactics, police or government information
  - Information about timers, electronics, or remote transmitters / receivers

*It is important to remember that just because someone’s speech, actions, beliefs, appearance, or way of life is different; it does not mean that he or she is suspicious.*



**Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC)**  
www.jric.org  
(888) 705-JRIC (5742) mention “Tripwire”

### What Should I Do?

#### Be part of the solution.

- ✓ Gather information about individuals without drawing attention to yourself
- ✓ Identify license plates, vehicle description, names used, languages spoken, ethnicity, etc.
- ✓ Do not collect metadata, content, or search electronic communications of individuals
- ✓ Do not do additional logging of on-line activity or monitor communications
- ✓ **If something seems wrong, notify law enforcement authorities.**


#### Do not jeopardize your safety or the safety of others.

Preventing terrorism is a community effort. By learning what to look for, you can make a positive contribution in the fight against terrorism. The **partnership between the community and law enforcement** is essential to the success of anti-terrorism efforts.


Some of the activities, taken individually, could be innocent and must be examined by law enforcement professionals in a larger context to determine whether there is a basis to investigate. The activities outlined on this handout are by no means all-inclusive but have been compiled from a review of terrorist events over several years.

This project was supported by Grant Number 2007-MU-BX-R002, awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Each indicator listed above, is by itself, lawful conduct or behavior and may also constitute the exercise of rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, there may be a wholly innocent explanation for conduct or behavior that appears suspicious in nature. For this reason, no single indicator should be the sole basis for law enforcement action. The totality of behavioral indicators and other relevant circumstances should be evaluated when considering any law enforcement response or action.

# Seek Actionable Changes



Before



After

See also Opt-In, Anonymization, Accountability, Consent, Limited Collection, Limited Use, Disclosure and Retention, Accuracy, Safeguards, Individual Access, Ability to Challenge, Privacy by Design...

# Risk of Uniqueness

## Panoptick

How Unique – and Trackable – Is Your Browser?

Your browser fingerprint **appears to be unique** among the 2,195,973 tested so far.

Currently, we estimate that your browser has a fingerprint that conveys **at least 21.07 bits of identifying information**.

The measurements we used to obtain this result are listed below. You can read more about our methodology, statistical results, and some defenses against fingerprinting in [this article](#).

Help us increase our sample size:      

# In Conclusion...

- Networked surveillance systems threaten our privacy and our free way of life
- Individuals can and should protect themselves
- This community has the knowledge and status to deflect the trajectory of our surveilled future

# For More Information...

Lisa Shay, Dominic Larkin, John Nelson, and Gregory Conti. "A Framework for Analysis of Quotidian Exposure in an Instrumented World." to be presented at IEEE International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, October 2012.

Greg Conti, Lisa Shay, and Woody Hartzog. "Life Inside a Skinner Box: Confronting our Future of Automated Law Enforcement." DEFCON 20, July 2012.

Lisa Shay, Woodrow Hartzog, John Nelson, Dominic Larkin and Gregory Conti. "Confronting Automated Law Enforcement." We Robot, April 2012.

Greg Conti. "Our Instrumented Lives: Sensors, Sensors, Everywhere." DEFCON 18, July 2010.

*We'd also like to thank John Nelson, Woody Hartzog, and Dominic Larkin for their support of this work.*



Questions?